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CAMBODIA AND THE "WASHINGTON CONSENSUS"
Sophal Ear'
Cambodia's economic progress from 1993 to the end of 1995, though
limited and short-lived, was encouraging. By employing an
analytical framework adapted from John Williamson's discussion of
the "Washington Consensus," I examine ten aspects of Cambodia's
domestic economic reform policies during the 1993-95 period. I also
consider the country's politico-economic position at that time
relative to the ASEAN member nations. It is argued that the
Consensus reforms, combined with Cambodia's then-prospective
membership in ASEAN, had the potential to boost not only.. the
country's own economic development but also that of the proposed
ASEAN Free Trade Area, to be established in the year 2003. Finally,
I suggest that Cambodia can still realize the reform goals it had
during the period under consideration.
Introduction: Cambodia and the "Washington Consensus"
In 1992, following decades of warfare and revolution, the
Cambodian government began normalizing relations with the
developed world and accepting large amounts of aid in the form of
grants and loans from bilateral and multilateral sources like the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the
World Bank's International Development Agency, and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). It did so with the idea of
becoming fully reintegrated into the global economy and of thereby
realizing greatly increased rates of economic growth. Invariably,
however, the proffered aid was conditioned by limits on how the
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1 John Williamson, "What Washington Means by Policy Reform," in Latin
American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?, John Williamson, ed., 7-20
(Washington, IX: Institute for International Economics, 1990). Williamson
was actually only one of a chorus of economists, such as Anne O. Krueger
and Hernando de Soto, to engage in framing new policy solutions for old
policy dilemmas. See, for instance, Robert H. Bates and Anne O. Krueger
(eds.), Political Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1993), and Hernando de Soto, The Other Path: The Invisible
Revolution in the Third World (New York: Harper & Row, 1989).
assistance funds could be spent as well as by directives as to what
kinds of economic reform the Cambodian government must
undertake to qualify for continued support. Normally, such
conditionality implies the implementation of a set of u.S.-sanctioned,
internationally administered structural reforms like those first
introduced in Latin America in the early 1980s and now known
collectively as the "Washington Consensus," following economist
John Williamson's use of that term in his seminal 1990 article, "What
Washington Means by Policy Reform."l After Latin America, the
Consensus was next applied in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
as, one by one, the post-communist era Eastern Bloc countries
privatized their state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Since then, the rise
of the Newly Industrializing Countries and the attendant
adjustments in their economies has in effect made the Washington
Consensus the mantra of economic reformers worldwide.
The Consensus was as relevant to Cambodia in the early 1990s
as elsewhere, for the shift from a socialist state-controlled economy
toward a capitalistic market-controlled one had serious political
ramifications as old party cadres sought, quite rationally, to preserve
their influence within a leadership obliged to adapt to the heterodox
practices of the increasingly powerful nouveaux riche. Certainly, no
one believed the country's economic transformation would be
smooth. Still, it was expected that with successful structural
adjustment measures, Cambodia would realize and sustain the same
balanced economic growth that had already been achieved by many
ASEAN members. The nation's commitment to reform can be seen in
the government's firm denial that the Consensus policies were
imposed on it by the various lending agencies and governments
concerned. Cambodian Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh, for
instance, insisted that there "were no conditions to the aid, no
pressure. Donors asked for clarification and we showed our
determination [to enact the reforms]."2
Recent events in Cambodia have eclipsed the economic
stabilization efforts of the early 1990s. Nevertheless, those efforts are
important in that they signal a radical and progressive departure
from the stultifying policies in effect prior to that time, in addition to
which they set a precedent for possible future reform. Indeed, should
Cambodia finally gain admission to ASEAN, and should the current
domestic turmoil subside without irreparable damage to the nation's
economy, a new phase of capitalistic reform will undoubtably arise,
in which case the lessons learned earlier will prove invaluable. In the
following sections of this paper I will therefore review Cambodia's
structural adjustment efforts from 1993 to the end of 1995 in terms of
the policy areas outlined by the Washington Consensus, with
comparisons to other ASEAN member countries, where possible? In
conclusion, I discuss Cambodia's economic performance as a result
of the Consensus reforms and touch on some concerns regarding the
economic effects of trade liberalization and policy credibility.
Cambodia's Implementation of
Washington Consensus Structural Adjustments
By definition, structural adjustment policies are administrative
instruments meant to create conditions conducive to sustained
economic growth. The focus on instruments here is significant, for it
implies the crucial assumption that the prescribed mechanisms will
indeed be employed in a manner conducive economic development.
2 In John Follain, "Cambodian Premier Plays Down Human Rights Abuses,"
Reuters News Service, March 16, 1995.
3 ASEAN, whose current members are the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and Brunei, was originally created as a non-
U.S. led security umbrella in 1967 to offset communist gains in Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia during the 1970s. The granting of membership to the
socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1995 marked the beginning of a new era for
ASEAN. In that same year, Cambodia and Laos gained observer status; and
Laos was granted full membership in 1997, as was Burma. Cambodia's
membership is still pending. See Reuters News Service, "Cambodia and Laos
to Join ASEAN by 1997," Dec. 25 (1995). Mr. Jeffrey Garten, the departing
U.s. Undersecretary for Commerce testified to the global importance of
ASEAN by predicting in September 1995 that by the tum of the century
ASEAN woUld be the United States' second largest trading partner next to
Mexico. See Kieran Cooke and Peter Montagnon, "A Liberal Pinch of
Eastern Spice: South-East Asian Countries are Opening Up for Trade,"
Financial Times, Oct. 18,1995,18.
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As Williamson explains, "It is generally assumed, at least in
technocratic Washington, that the standard economic objectives of
growth, low inflation, a viable balance of payment, and an equitable
income distribution should determine the disposition of such
instruments."4 Another important characteristic of the Consensus is
its advocacy of private-sector market mechanisms, since throughout
much of the developing world, long government intervention in, or
even direct ownership of, the commercial economy has resulted in
tremendous market inefficiencies, and therefore sluggish growth.
As defined by Williamson, the Washington Consensus calls
specifically for structural adjustments of the economy in the ten
following areas:
1. Fiscal Policy
2. Public Expenditure Priorities
3. Tax Policy
4. The Privatization of State-owned Enterprises
5. Interest Rate Policy
6. The Deregulation of Industry
7. Foreign Direct Investment
8. Property Rights
9. Exchange Rate Policy
10. Trade Liberalization (and Credibility)5
The inclusion of credibility as a policy area under trade liberalization
(number 10 above) is my own. This addition seems to me necessary
because the relative focus of the Consensus on policies and
instruments rather than objectives or outcomes makes it difficult for
reforming economies to gain a foothold in the global marketplace. It
is no mean feat, for instance, for a developing country to establish
and maintain credibility when it refuses in its policy-making process
to prioritize such sacred-cow economic indicators as rates of
inflation, unemployment, and growth. In theory, therefore, the
Consensus prescriptions are tremendously challenging to any
government seeking to adopt them. Yet the economic successes
scored in the early 1980s in Latin America and later in the Czech
Republic and the Asian NICs, to mention just those few, show these
4 Williamson, "What Washington Means by Policy Reform," 7, italics added.
5 List adapted from Williamson, "Democracy and the 'Washington
Consensus,'" World Development 21(8):1332-1333 (1993).
76 Crossroads 11:2
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same adjustment measures to be both feasible and flexible. It was
therefore with every expectation of succeeding that the Cambodian
government embarked upon its own process of reform in the early
1990s. How it fared in this endeavor is discussed below with specific
reference to the ten Consensus policy areas listed above. In each case,
the general Consensus prescription is given, after which Cambodia's
application of the prescription is assessed.
1. Fiscal Policy
Consensus prescription:6 Budget deficits, properly distributed
among prOVincial governments, state enterprises, and the central
bank, should be small enough to be financed without recourse to an
inflation tax. This typically implies a primary surplus (that which
exists before adding debt service to expenditure) of several percent
of GDP and an operational deficit (the deficit disregarding that part
of the interest bill that simply compensates for inflation) of no more
than two percent of GDP.
Situation in Cambodia: Continued Restraint with Qualified
Overruns. Under UNTAC (the United Nations Temporary
Administration of Cambodia), Cambodia's fiscal budget saw its fair
share of deficits (see Table 2). At 1.4 % of Gross Domestic Product in
1994, however, the deficit was small enough to be the envy of other
developing countries, and one IMF report at the time stated that
fiscal policy "played a central role in maintaining financial stability
[in Cambodia] during 1994 and early 1995" and that "[d]espite
significant overruns in security and defense spending, strong
revenue performance and tight controls over nondefense spending
kept the current fiscal deficit to 1-1/2 percent of GDP in 1994."7 Of
course, this statistic masks inaccuracies in budget measurements, but
the Ministry of Finance and Economy began to address this problem
too by encouraging all ministries to report the amounts of incoming
and outgoing revenues so as to make assessments of fiscal programs
easier and more accurate.
6 The consensus prescriptions here and in the following nine policy areas are
adopted from Williamson, "What Washington Means by Policy Reform."
7 International Monetary Fund, "IMF Approves Second Annual Loan for
Cambodia under EASAF," Press Release, Sept. 15, 1995,95.47.
(in billion of riels)
(in % of total current expenditure)
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1995 1996 1997
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget
299.0 421.2 392.3 400.7 383.5
73.4 72.4 83.8 80.5 87.9
36.2 26.1 60.4 44.0 60.7
17.2 15.3 20.8 18.7 24.4
grew only marginally from FY 1994 to FY 1995, and health care,
which shrunk by 24% in terms of relative share of overall public
expenditures, were reassessed for possible increases. These measures
Source: World Bank, Cambodia: Progress in Recovery and Reform (Washington,
D.C.: World Bank, East Asia and Pacific Region, Country Department
1,1997), 20. Note: The unaccounted residual budget for these years was not
explained. This does not necessarily pose a problem since the total fiscal
budget denominator used for each year is the same for each category. The
unaccounted residual budget mi~ht be considered a statistical discrepancy
in measurement. However, thIS presents another problem: how can
something as planned and methodical as a budget have such high levels of
unaccounted residuall funds?
1994 1995 1996 1997
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget
Defense and Security 48.4 59.1 45.8 57.6 52.2 50.5 44.1
Education 10.9 9.2 11.3 9.9 11.2 10.1 10.1
Health 7.2 4.5 5.5 3.6 8.0 5.5 7.0
Agriculture & rural 2.5 1.9 2.6 2.1 2.8 2.4 2.8
development





Defense and Security283.2 391.5
Education 63.8 61.0
Health 42.4 30.0
Agriculture & rural 14.9 12.4
development
Total Current
Expenditure 585.6 662.3 652.7 731.7 751.0 793.9 870.0
Table 1: Current Expenditure by Sector"
8 Maja Wallengren, "Rubber-Rich Cambodian Province Seeks Investors,"
Reuters News Service, Aug. 10,1995.
9 Hardev Kaur, "Cambodia: Malaysia Offers to Help Cambodia," Business
Times (Malaysia), Apr. 15, 1994.
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Situation in Cambodia: The Cambodian fiscal budgets for
1994 and 1995 (Table 1), the revenues for which came primarily from
foreign aid and tariffs, show that far more government funds went to
defense than to any other sector of the public economy. This gross
imbalance, if indeed genuine, is understandable given the
government's hope that eliminating the Khmer Rouge once and for
all would make the country more attractive to foreign investors. No
doubt the government was sensitive to such reports as that by
Reuters saying that "Foreign investors have generally shied away
from investing in Cambodia's rural sector for fear of problems
related to the guerrilla war.'nl We know that Cambodia's ASEAN
neighbors never spent half their total budgets on defense, as
Cambodia apparently did for the period 1994-96; but these
neighbors, though sometimes involved in wars, were free of the
intense and ongoing internal strife that threatened Cambodia's
national security at this time.
Nevertheless, Cambodia's large expenditures on defense
necessarily meant inordinately small appropriations to several
areas-primary health care, education, public works, etc.-strongly
supported by the Consensus. In an effort to downplay the
importance of the civil war, Prime Minister Ranariddh maintained
that Cambodia's biggest problem was not the Khmer Rouge but the
difficulties of development and reconstruction. 9 The government
therefore reduced its subsidies to both the civil service, which had
theretofore absorbed a whopping '30% of the state budget, and the
officer corps, which had at one time had thousands of phantom
military personnel on its payroll. The budgets for education, which
2. Public Expenditure Priorities
Consensus prescription: Public expenditure should be
redirected away from administration, defense, indiscriminate
subsidies, and other politically sensitive areas that typically receive
more funds than economic returns justify, and into such fields as
primary health care, education, and infrastructure that have high
economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution.
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were all consistent with Washington Consensus prescriptions. As
Williamson notes,
One of the legacies of the Reagan administration and its
"supply-side" allies has been to create a preference in
Washington for reducing expenditures rather than
increasing tax revenues.... Military expenditures are
sometimes privately deplored, but in general they are
regarded as the ultimate prerogative of sovereign
governments and accordingly off limits to international
technocrats. . . . Subsides, especially indiscriminate
subsidies (including subsidies to cover the losses of state
enterprises) are regarded as prime candidates for
reduction or preferably elimination.... Education and
health, in contrast, are regarded as essentially proper
objects of governmentexpenditure.10
Spending on agriculture and rural development stayed about the
same from 1994 to 1995 (increasing marginally in 1996 to 2.4% of the
budget) while that on public works-a subject on which the
Washington Consensus is equivocal-was nearly halved from 1994
to 1995.11
3 . Tax Policy
Consensus Prescription: The tax base should be broadened
and marginal tax rates cut so as to sharpen investment incentives
and improve horizontal equity without lowering realized
progressivity. Improved administration has been an important
aspect of broadening the tax base in Latin America. Taxing interest
assets held abroad ("flight capital") should be another priority in the
coming decade.
Situation in Cambodia: Taxation, which goes hand-in-hand
with spending, required little immediate reform in Cambodia, at
least with respect to income, sales, property, flat or poll taxes. The
tax base in Cambodia is small: GOP per capita was only $220 in 1994
10 Williamson, "What Washington Means by Policy Reform," 11.
11 See Raoul Jennar, "Cambodge: A Qui Profite La Reconstruction?" Demain:
Le monde, 2:13-15.
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and $250 in 1995,12 Yet improved tax and customs collections
resulting from the introduction of better bookkeeping procedures
and computerized accounting systems allowed the government to
cut costs and keep track of delinquent commercial tax accounts.13
Another top priority was that of compiling an inventory of
government properties so as to make possible the accurate
accounting of rent income from properties leased to foreign firms.14
In February 1995, the government also looked into a value-added tax
of 2 to 3% to offset a planned reduction in customs duties, which at
the time accounted for 30% of state revenues. IS As collection
procedures improve, increased revenues will help ease prevailing
budget deficits (0.8% in 1996).
4. Privatization of State-owned Enterprises
Consensus Prescription: State enterprises should be
privatized.
Situation in Cambodia: "Soft Privatization" and Long-term
Leasing of Assets. In an interview in June of 1995, Cambodian
Minister of Industry, Energy, and Mines Pou Sothirak said: "We [the
Royal Cambodian Government] firmly believe the private sector can
much better kickstart the economic development because foreign
investors have the capital. It's quite obvious that the state does not
have enough money."16 Sothirak's statement is consistent with
Williamson's characterization of the Consensus as calling for the
privatization of state-owned enterprises in "the belief that private
industry is managed more efficiently than state enterprises, because
of the more direct incentives faced by a manager who either has a
12 United States Government, Cambodia Country Commercial Guide FY1996
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996). All $ are in U.s.
dollars unless noted otherwise.
13 Formerly, the procedure of collecting taxes involved negotiations between
the taxpayer and tax collector, since records of transactions were purposely
Eoorly Kept.
4 Harish Mehta, "Cambodia: Jungle Economy Emerging from the Woods,"
Business Times (Singapore), March 22,1995.
15 Bangkok Post, "Cambodia: Khmers Eye Stock Market," Feb. 24, 1995.
16 As interviewed by Maja Wallengren, "Interview-Cambodia Plans
Industry Reforms," Reut~s News Service, June 21,1995.
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direct personal stake in the profits of the enterprise or else is
accountable to those who do."17
The plan Cambodia devised for privatization, based on the
idea of "soft privatization," was unlike those in the Eastern
European countries, where schemes such as vouchers have been
employed. "Soft" privatization postpones the selling of state-owned
enterprises for an extended period of time, say 25 to 30 years. Using
this scheme, the Cambodian government initially made 47 factories
available to foreign investors, with 11 more following shortly
thereafter.1S A scheme of longer term leases of up to 70 years for land
was provided for in November 1994. In some industries
privatization proceeded particularly quickly, as in the state-owned
rubber plantations in Ratanakiri province.
5. Interest Rate Policy
Consensus Prescription: The ultimate objective is to institute
market-determined interest rates. Experience has shown, however,
that when investor confidence is low, market-determined rates can
become so high as to threaten the financial solvency of commercial
enterprises and, ultimately, the government. Under those
circumstances, a sensible interim measure is to abolish preferential
interest rates for privileged borrowers in favor of a moderately
positive real interest rate.
Situation in Cambodia: Due to widespread financial
indiscretions in the Central Bank of Cambodia as well as to the rise
of a dollar-based domestic economy and the absence of stock, bond,
and treasury bill markets, the Cambodian reil was closely pegged to
the U.S. dollar. This was good in at least one sense: even when the
volume of circulating riels changed dramatically, commodity prices
in dollars remained the same. However, the situation rendered
Cambodian monetary policy totally ineffective as an instrument for
controlling inflation, unemployment, and interest rates. With help
from the IMF, the government hoped to reissue treasury bills by the
end of 1995. According to the IMP, these bills would be used "to
establish a market-determined interest rate for the riel[,] which is
17 Williamson, "What Washington Means by Policy Reform," 16.
IS As interviewed by Wallengren, "Interview."
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lacking because of the high dollarization in the economy and the
very limited use of the national currency in the banking system."19
As with the regulation of industry (see item 6), which seemed
to have gone awry throughout most of Latin America, the lack of
interest rate regulations in Cambodia frightened foreign investors.
6. Deregulation ofIndustry
Consensus Prescription: Governments should abolish
regulations that either restrict competition or impede the
establishment of new firms. All regulations should be justified by
such criteria as safety, environmental protection, and the prudent
supervision of financial institutions.
Situation in Cambodia: Deregulation aims to reduce the maze
of regulatory failures that stifle and impair the private sector. In the
American and Mexican contexts, to name but two, this is sound
strategy. Trucking in both countries was heavily regulated for many
years, and consumers incurred millions of dollars of added expense
due to the lack of competition and the monopolization of routes. In
the U.S., railroads too were regulated until the Carter administration
deregulated both industries, whereupon consumer savings increased
dramatically. American consumers have also saved millions of
dollars from airline deregulation.2o In Cambodia, however, the
problem is neither overregulation of private industry nor regulatory
failure but the chaos of no regulation at all. For example, although
the country had 29 registered banks as of June 1995, the licenses held
by these banks were highly suspect, having been issued during an
unregulated frenzy of registration in the final days of the Vietnam-
backed Hun Sen government in 1993.21 Many "banks" were in fact
merely fronts for unscrupulous money-laundering operations and
consisted of little more than an office, a desk, and a fax machine.
Even more disturbing was the well-known fact that many banks
laundered money and gave loans only to members of their own
board of directors.
19 International Monetary Fund, "IMF Approves Second Annual Loan."
20 Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. PerIoff, Modern Industrial Organization,
2nd ed. (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1994), 901-904.
21 Mark Dodd, "Cambodian Banking Industry Faces Reform," Reuter
Textline, June 4,1995.
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Like other socialist and formerly socialist economies, for a long
time Cambodia had no commercial banking infrastructure and thus
no need for banking regulations. With the country's reentry into
global economic affairs, however, the need for regulations arose
quickly. Gregory Root, president of Thomson BankWatch, Inc.,
reminded the developing world that the creditworthiness of any
national economy in the eyes of private investors and lending
institutions depends on "the extent to which government plays a role
in the banking system through regulation and controls."22 The
National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) therefore began investigating the
nearly 30 banks that opened during the period of unregulated
licensing in 1993 and taking action against those that proved
illegitimate. Despite these measures, however, and at a time when
the ASEAN countries were enjoying truly impressive credit ratings
(Salomon Brothers' Vice President Peter Plaut called Malaysia "one
of the developing world's most stable democracies ... and one of the
most rapidly developing economies'-23), bank licensing in Cambodia
remained problemmatic and crippling. 24 What little regulatory
success the government had was not in banking but in gambling. A
1994 deal with the Ariston company (Malaysia) to build the $1.3
billion floating Naga Casino, for example, led to a crackdown on 300
illegal casinos and gaming houses in Phnom Penh.25
7. Foreign Direct Investment
Consensus Prescription: Barriers impeding the establishment
of foreign firms should be abolished; foreign and domestic firms
should be allowed to compete on equal terms.
22 As quoted in Toni Reinhold, "USA: Southeast Asia Growth Prospects
Robust-US Analysts," Reuter Textline, Feb. 24.
23 Reinhold "USA: Southeast Asia Growth Prospects."
24 The deputy governor of the NBC put the matter succinctly in saying that
whether or not a bank was awarded a license was "not a matter of quantity
[of already licensed banks]. If American Express came here tomorrow we'd
be quite happy to give it a banking license. But this is a vicious circle-
American Express is not going to come here if there are 30 banks." Qtd. in
Dodd, "Cambodian Banking Iridustry Faces Reform."
25 Reuter Textline, "Cambodia: Cambodian Government Orders Gambling
Crackdown," May 12, 1995. It should be noted that with the end of the
crackdown, unregulated gambling reappeared in many backalley
operations.
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Situation in Cambodia: CDC a One-stop-shop. Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI), a major component of the Washington Consensus,
was a qualified success for Cambodia, where investors from
Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and other ASEAN member countries
bought up large shares in the country's airline, telephone, and
gambling industries. A 1994 investment law taxed corporations at a
rate of 9%, much lower than Malaysia's 30% rate. Other investment
incentives included tax holidays of up to eight years, the carrying
forward of losses for five years, full import duty exemptions,
allowances for the repatriation of profits at no charge, provisions for
the use of public lands for up to 70 years, and the absence altogether
of export taxes, withholding taxes on dividends, and nationalization
policies.26 Cambodia's investment regulations in fact followed the
Consensus quite closely in the sense that foreign and domestic
investors were treated equally in all respects except that foreign
investors could not own land.
To increase FDI further, the government created the
Cambodian Investment Board (CIB), a one-stop agency for foreign
investors. Falling under the auspices of the Council for the
Development of Cambodia (CDC) and chaired by Finance Secretary
of State Chanthol Sun, the CIB took charge of very large investment
projects, such as Ariston's proposed five-star casino off the coast of
Cambodia at Sihanoukville.27 Secretary Sun reportedly said that
investments were "still coming in strong" and that US$375 million of
FDI was approved during the first five months of 1995 .28 While
actual investment was invariably less than that pledged, these
numbers are still impressive?9 The CDC did, alas, create perverse
incentives for some unscrupulous individuals connected with the
agency, but there were also positive reviews of the convenient one-
stop-shop nature of the CIB. The Cambodia Country Commercial Guide
for 1996 stated that "[w]hile investors occasionally report that they
experience delays in application approvals and must visit additional
ministries, they also say that Cambodia requires comparatively less
26 Bangkok Post, "Cambodia: Khmers Eye Stock Market."
27 The casino had yet to see groundbreaking as of Summer 1996, when the
author visited the site.
28 Reuters News Service, "Cambodia Economy Said Heading in the Right
Direction," Aug. 21,1995.
29 Indonesia, a long-time member of ASEAN, took in $2.4 billion in approved
FDI in 1994, compared to Cambodia's "official" $2 billion (the figure for
Cambodia includes initial investments in the Ariston Naga Casino project).
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30 United States Government, Cambodia COU/ltn; Commercial Guide.
31 Chanthol Sun as quoted in Business VietNam, "Cambodia's Biggest CasinoYet," Sept. 1995.
32 Reuter Tcxtline, "Singapore Aims to Boost Trade with Cambodia in '95,"
Jan. 19,1995.
33 Reuter Textline, "Singapore Aims to Boost Trade."
If McCann Erickson says Cambodia is the greatest place
in the world to invest in, businessmen will
understandably take that statement with a pinch of salt
because McCann is Cambodia's official advertising
agency.... But when stiff-collared multinationals and
hard-nosed businessmen say the time has come to invest
in Cambodia, other investors who stayed on the
sidelines have a tendency to perk up and take notice. By
investing in Cambodia, major Asian firms like DBS land,
Petronas, and multinationals like Coke, Pepsi and Shell
have sent a signal that there is money to be made in
Cambodia. Morgan Stanley strategist Barton Biggs has
also begun saying nice things about Cambodia, a
country he feels is open for business primarily because it
is among a handful of Asian economies to emerge as a
red tape than other countries in the region."30 Cambodia hoped
eventually to open a stock exchange to direct savings toward more
productive ends. Speaking at the time, Secretary Sun said the
Exchange would be yet another device to help Cambodia establish
financial credibility, since companies would then be able to invest
directly in the private sector without going through the
government.31
Nor were investors scarce. Reuters quoted Singapore's Trade
Development Board as saying that it would step up its promotional
activities in Cambodia in 1995 and send several business
development missions there to "follow up" on business
opportunities that had arisen since the beginning of the country's
readjustment process. 32 The same report speculated that the "recent
liberalization of investment regulations and [the] setting up of the
Council Development of Cambodia has sped up the process of
approving investment applications in the country," which for
Singapore were valued at $260 million.33 The Business Times of
Singapore joined in this optimism, explaining that
87Crossroads 11:2
34 Mehta, "Cambodia: Jungle Economy Emerging."
35 Williamson, "What Washington Means by Policy Reform," 15.
36 United States Government, Cambodia Country Commercial Guide.
Situation in Cambodia: The security of private property is
guaranteed in the Cambodian Constitution as follows: "Article 60-
Khmer citizens shall have the right to sell their own products. The
obligation to sell products to the State, or the temporary use of State
or properties shall be prohibited unless authorized by law under
special circumstances."35 Since law enforcement is weak, however,
the legal system has never become fully instated, and the only
security for private property was (and remains) that provided by the
barrel of a gun or by what influential persons one knows. No
limitations were placed on foreign and domestic businesses in
Cambodia, except for the proviso that only Cambodian citizens or
domestic businesses could own land. Laws were drafted regarding
intellectual property, and the government ratified a bilateral trade
agreement with the United States to establish standards for
intellectual property rights.36
9. Exchange Rates
Consensus Prescription: Countries need a unified exchange
rate (at least for trade transactions), set at a level to induce rapid
growth in non-traditional exports and managed so as to insure
continued competitiveness.
promlsmg new area for investments. Analysts are
correct when they say that a chunk of the world's
investment resources worth some US $40 billion this
year is likely to go into economies such as China, India,
Vietnam, Indonesia and Cambodia-eollectively known
as the new frontier for investments.34
8. Property Rights
Consensus Prescription: The legal system should provide
secure property rights without excessive cost and should make those
rights available to all sectors of the economy, including that
currently operating on an "under the table" or black market basis.
Crossroads 11:286
Sophal Ear Cambodia and the "Washington Consensus"
37 United States Government, Cambodia Country Commercial Guide.
38 Data for Thailand are from Tanya Sirivedhim, "Comment (to Fiscal and
Monetary Policy in the Growth Process)" in Strategies for Structural
Adjustment: The Experience of Southeast Asia, Ungku A. Aziz, ed.
(Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1990),70.
10. Trade Liberalization and the Maintenance of Credibility
Consensus Prescription: Quantitative trade restrictions should
be replaced by tariffs, and tariffs should be progressively reduced to
a uniformly low rate of approximately ten percent (twenty percent at
the most). There is some disagreement about how rapidly tariffs
should be reduced (with recommendations of between 3 and 10
years) and about whether the process should be slowed when
macroeconomic conditions are adverse (as during times of recession
or payment deficits).
Concern over credibility, or the lack thereof, develops only
indirectly from Williamson's Consensus, but if one considers trade
liberalization in realistic terms, as Joshua Aizenman does, credibility
Situation in Cambodia: Floating and Appreciating. Monetary
policy in Cambodia remained too weak for the government to
effectively manage the exchange rate, which in 1996 stood at
approximately 2300 riel to US$1. During 1992 and 1993, the rate
dropped to as low as 5000 riel to US$I, but then stabilized at
between 2500 and 2600 riel to US$1 in 1994. According to the
Cambodia Country Commercial Guide, the National Bank of Cambodia
regulated foreign exchange by way of an auction system, which kept
the spread between the official and free market rates below 2 percent
in 1993 and less than 1 percent after July 1994 .37 Advised by the IMF,
the CBC issued treasury bills to stabilize interest rates and circulated
higher denomination notes so as to "de-dollarize" the economy and
gain better control of the money supply. The impact of these
measures were relatively slight, however, in face of the country's
political crises. Thus, whereas restrictive monetary policies in the
aftermath of the 1980s global oil crisis helped Thailand stabilize its
economy and devalue the baht by 8.7% in 1981 and by another 14.8%
in 1984, the situation in Cambodia's never reached the point where
monetary devaluation was possible.38
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39 Joshua Aizenman, "Trade Reforms, Credibility, and Development,"
[oumal of Development Economics, 39 (1992): 163-187. Norbert Funke explains
that credibility lapses when "private expectations about future policies
deviate from the government's explicit or Implicit announcement." Norbert
Funke, "Timinpand Sequencing of Reforms: Competing Views and the Role
of Credibility,' KYKLOS 46 (1993): 343.
40 National Voice of Cambodia, "Cambodia: Government to Allow Export of
Rice Beginning 1st December," Reuters Text/ine, May 3,1995.
41 Such a project is consistent with Aizenman's suggestion that investments
by the Mexican government in highways, telecommunications, and
infrastructure in Tijuana and along the"Mexican border with California may
Situation in Cambodia: Trade liberalization is a natural
component of the Washington Consensus and was practiced by
many of Cambodia's ASEAN neighbors via export-led growth. But
the experience of ASEAN suggests that Cambodia's best strategy
may have been to practice import substitution to fill domestic
demand and then, once domestic demand was filled, move toward
the adoption of export-oriented strategies for development.
Cambodia has a mixed record for efforts to bolster credibility.
Some failures are due simply to communication oversights. For
example, the Cambodian government was expected to lift its ban on
rice exports by the end of 1995,40 yet prospective exporters were
given no signals, other than a National Voice of Cambodia broadcast
stating that removal of the ban would be in line with a signed
understanding between the Cambodia and the IMF, that this trade
policy would ever become permanent. In other ways, the
government deserves more praise. No doubt partly to increase
economic credibility, it set about constructing a highway designed to
bisect the country east to west, thereby linking Phnom Penh with the
capitals of Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.41 Also, a $10 million grant
becomes an important aspect of any structural adjustment policy.39
With respect to interest rates, Williamson talks of the chronic lack of
confidence that plagues developing countries and leads to
intolerably high (and unproductive) rates of interest. This further
lessens credibility and discourages investment, as happened when
Mexican dollar-indexed tesobonos (bonds) peaked at a near 25%
interest rate and the Central Bank was forced to devalue the peso.
Certainly, if a government wishes to minimize such problems as
excessive inflation or lack of consumer and investor confidence, its
credibility must be sound.
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from Germany was slated for the laying of a telephone land line
from the Cambodian capital to Thailand.42 Given the combination of
Cambodia's move toward greater public investment and Thailand's
high national income and commitment to tariff reductions (to less
than 5% by the year 2003, the deadline for the ASEAN Free Trade
Area [AFTAJ), this irnminant connection between the two countries
made Cambodia more attractive than ever to outside investors.
With respect to the United States and Cambodia, the Cambodia
Country Commercial Guide confirmed that trade between the two
countries was "low" during 1994, totaling only $1.8 million of
exports to and $7.4 million of imports from the U.5.43 Most Favored
Nation trade status for Cambodia remained pending,44 but the Guide
did anticipate increased import activity in the follOWing sectors: 1)
architecture, construction, and engineering services; 2) agricultural
machinery and equipment; 3) used cars and automotive parts and
services; and 4) drugs and pharmaceuticals. Before 1980, Cambodia
was an unwelcome trading partner in the West due to its status as a
subject nation of the Republic of Vietnam. The economic successes of
ASEAN countries like Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia, however,
who practiced export-led growth development strategies, provided
convincing precedents for possibilities in Cambodia should similar
policies be implemented there. Singapore, which like Cambodia is
very small relative to its neighbors and must look to external
markets to achieve even minimum economies of scale, provided an
especially fitting model of development.45
Conclusion: General Assessment of Washington Consensus
Reforms in Cambodia
Critics have argued that the structural adjustment policies
called for by the Washington Consensus are too harsh on developing
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countries and that Washington itself frequently violates them.
Williamson, for instance, writes that "My term is a misnomer
because the 'Washington consensus' is being implemented in every
capital of the hemisphere bar Washington.',ol6 Nevertheless,
Cambodia's efforts to revitalize its economy progressed remarkably
well during the 1993-95 period. In 1993, the IMF approved a $41
million Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility loan "in support of
the Government's 1995-96 macroeconomic and structural adjustment
program."47 A year later, in May, 1994, the IMF affirmed that "[t]he
anchor for financial stability during the period of the ESAF-
supported program will continue to be tight financial policies
designed to avoid monetary financing of the budget. As a result, the
growth in liquidity will be curtailed and inflation held in check,
which will help support increased stability of the exchange rate.,048
The national budget held a deficit of only about .6% of GOP in 1995,
and inflation fell from a high of 112% in 1992 to under 10% in 1995-
96. Although the revitalization process was still in its early stages in
1996, the IMP that year favorably analyzed the country's success in
instituting a range of structural reforms, induding the privatization
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the creation of a body of
regulatory statutes, and the downsizing of the military and civil
service sectors. Table 2, which draws on data reported by the World
Bank, shows an unmistakable trend toward fundamental economic
stability in a number of areas that according to Consensus wisdom
are crucial to a nation's economic well-being.
Of course, both the IMP and the World Bank rely upon official
government statistics, the accuracy of which must be seriously
questioned.49 Still, that fact that all economic indicators were
pointing in the same direction-increased real GOP growth rate and
decreased inflation since 1994-was encouraging. In addition, the
IMF and the World Bank reported that from 1994 to 1995
government spending decreased as a percentage of GOP while
generate positive externalities. Aizenman, 'Trade Reforms, Credibility, andDevelopment," 39.
42 Reuters News Service, "German Aid for Cambodia-Thailand Phone Line,"
Dec. 8, 1995.
43 United States Government, Cambodia Country Commercial Guide.
44 The U.S. granted Cambodia MFN status in late 1996.
45 For a detailed discussion of Singapore's development history, see
Bernardo M. Villegas, "Economics Adjustment, Financing, and Growth," in
Strategies for Stnlctllral Adjustment: The Experience of Southeast Asia, Ungku A.
Aziz, ed. (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1990),37.
46 Williamson, "Democracy and the 'Washington Consensus,'" 1329.
47 International Monetary Fund, "IMF Approves Second Annual Loan."
48 PRNewswire, "USA: IMF Approves ESAF Credit for Cambodia," May 6,
1995.
49 Other sources make somewhat different projections from those given in
Table 2. The CambodiaCollntry Commercial Guide puts Cambodia's real GDP
growth in 1994 at 5.2%. The same guide placed the inflation rate at 14.8% for
1994 and 13.8% for 1995. United States Government, Cambodia Country
Commercial Guide.
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Source: World Bank, Cambodia: Progress in Recovery and Reform (Washington,
D.C.: World Bank, East Asia and Pacific Region, Country Department 1,1997),
4.
(Percentage Change)
Cambodia 3.5 1.2 7. 7.0 4.1 4.0 7.6 6.5
Indonesia 9.1 9.0 8.9 7.2 7.3 7.5 8.2 7.8
Malaysia 9.2 9.6 8.6 7.8 8.3 9.2 9.5 8.2
Philippines 6.2 3.0 -0.6 0.3 2.1 4.4 4.8 5.5
Thailand 12.2 11.6 8.1 8.2 8.5 8.9 8.7 6.4
Vietnam 7.8 4.9 6.0 8.6 8.1 8.8 9.5 9.5
Singapore 9.6 9.0 7.3 6.2 10.4 10.1 8.8 7.0
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: A Survey by the
Staffof the International Monetary Fund-October 1997, World Economic and

























Table 3: GDP Growth Rates, Cambodia and her ASEAN neighbors






Gross official reserves -- 30
(months of import of goods and services,
(in millions ofUS$)
Current budget deficit -3.0 -3.3
(cash basis, excl. grant)
(% of GOP)
Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Indicators
1991 1992
foreign exchange revenues increased from $115 million to $146
million. Exchange volatility was especially pronounced during
UNTAC, but throughout 1996 the riel remained below the 1994 high
mark of 2,585 riel to the dollar-a small but definite sign of economic
stability.
Although other ASEAN countries fared more or less as well as
Cambodia with respect to GOP growth rates during these years
(Table 3), Cambodia's structural adjustment arOSe from a distinctly
different context. As already stated, the problem with the economy
was neither an excess of regulation nor "government failure" but
rather the absence of effective regulation due to decades of war,
revolution, and foreign occupation. Cambodia's civil service as well
as much of the military was throughout this period controlled by the
country's former Marxist rulers under the guise of the re-christened
Cambodian People's Party (CPP), and this hold-over from the
socialist past embodied little that was useful to Cambodia's
democratically elected government as it tried to effect national
recovery. Some government factions sincerely attempted fiscal and
monetary restraint, but they did so largely in vain. The continuing
low-level war along the Thai border against Maoist Khmer Rouge
guerrillas (who controlled Cambodia from 1975 to 1978 and turned
the economy into an agrarian collective) was a significant factor in
this failure.
Still, the analysis shows that the Consensus policies were
clearly justified in all areas except deregulation, interest rates, and
exchange rates, Where too little development had yet taken place to
warrant investing valuable human, financial, and material resources
in reform efforts. As Cambodia anticipated admission into ASEAN,
it planned to unilaterally reduce its tariffs to less than 5% within a
few years of AFTA's establishment, secure in the belief that the
economic integration resulting from the reductions would render
sizable financial gains well into the next century-and this despite
the fact that customs duties comprised a major and increasing
portion of the Royal Cambodian Government's revenues (30% in1995).50
There remained difficulties, of course. For one thing, although
ASEAN planned to remove non-tariff trade barriers, including
customs regulations, specifications, and subsidies, beginning
January I, 1996, by the end of that year most such barriers




remained. 51 In fact, considering that ASEAN has promoted free trade
continuously since 1967, it had achieved very little in that area. One
anonymous international trade economist was quoted as saying that
"ASEAN has been around for a long time, and they really haven't
done anything."52 But this critique seems a rather too harsh, for the
organization did serve, and continues to serve, a useful function in
economic development, and Cambodia's inclusion in ASEAN
promised to greately strengthen both the nation's economy and its
credibility as a regional trading partner. Now that membership has
been indefinitely postponed, perhaps the hoped for benefits will
follow if the government grasps the opportunity now to make a
concerted second effort at instituting Washington Consensus reform
before the 1998 elections.
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